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The temporal nature of legitimation: the case of IFRS8  
 
 
Legitimation can operate on an episodic or continual basis (Suchman, 1995). We examine the 
temporal legitimation of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)’s actions 
during the adoption and review of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 8 
‘Operating Segments’. We conceptualise the controversy surrounding IFRS8 as an episode 
when the IASB sought segmental reporting convergence with the US standard, SFAS 131. 
Interpreting evidence from 15 (20) semi-structured interviews undertaken in 2009 (2011), 
before (after) entities reported under IFRS8, reveals its adoption precipitated an episodic 
legitimacy threat from selected audiences to the actions of the IASB. We discuss the IASB’s 
attempt to influence legitimation for this episode through commitment to a post-
implementation review (IFRS Foundation, 2011) of IFRS8. Interpreting legitimacy concerns 
across diverse audiences about specific actions of the IASB (the introduction of IFRS8) 
enables us to draw conclusions about the resilience of the IASB as a standard setting 
organisation, in itself. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The current paper examines the temporal nature of legitimation through the actions of the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in relation to its adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 8 ‘Operating Segments’. There are two divergent 
theoretical approaches to examining organisational legitimacy: strategic and institutional 
(Suchman, 1995). In the current paper we use the strategic approach, which conceptualises 
legitimation as an operational resource of the organisation seeking to gain, maintain or repair 
legitimacy. By contrast, the institutional approach conceptualises legitimacy as a set of 
embedded institutions, cultures, norms and beliefs that are cognitively accepted as part of 
organisational life. The IASB is often thought to legitimise its existence with diverse 
audiences using a number of strategies to manage conflicts between different constituencies’ 
“systems of beliefs or points of view” (Suchman, 1995, p576), so that IFRSs are perceived as 
“desirable, proper and appropriate”. Suchman (1995) also argues that legitimation has a 
temporal dimension, distinguishing between legitimation dynamics that “operate on an 
episodic or transitory basis from those that are continual and long-lasting” (p583). In this 
paper, we conceptualise the controversy surrounding IFRS8 as an episode in time when the 
IASB set out to converge segmental reporting practice with the US standard, Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standard 131 (SFAS), and sought legitimation for this action from its 
diverse constituencies1. 
 
 We report evidence from 15 semi-structured interviews undertaken in 2009 before entities 
reported under IFRS8 and 20 further semi-structured interviews in 2011, after IFRS8 became 
operational. Our research is interpreted through the theoretical lens of legitimacy, with a 
particular focus on the temporal nature of pragmatic and moral legitimation. We argue that 
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the episode surrounding the controversial adoption of IFRS8 precipitated a legitimacy threat 
from selected audiences to the actions of the IASB. Specifically, audience concern was raised 
about the IFRS8’s potential impact on financial reporting and the IASB’s due process 
surrounding the adoption of this standard. Interpreting legitimacy concerns across diverse 
audiences about the episodic actions of the IASB (the introduction of IFRS8) enables us to 
draw conclusions about the resilience of the IASB as a standard setting organisation in itself. 
We discuss the extent to which the IASB’s attempt to influence legitimacy for this IFRS8 
episode, through committing to a post-implementation review of the new standard, was 
successful. 
 
The IASB is a private organisation responsible for setting IFRSs to be applied by reporting 
entities operating across the globe. As a result, it relies on support from diverse audiences to 
legitimise its behaviour; that it is “operating [actions] in a desirable, proper and appropriate 
manner” and that the IASB, as an organisation, “is desirable, proper and appropriate in itself 
[its essence]” (Suchman, 1995, p583). There is evidence that the IASB’s “essence” (p583) is 
widely perceived as legitimate based on the support that it receives from several 
supranational organisations, for example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank (WB) and the Basel Committee (IFRS Foundation, 2015). 2 In addition, at the national 
level, the fact that many countries either require or allow IFRS to be used by public listed 
companies when reporting in their jurisdictions suggests evidence of support.3 Indeed, the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB)  specifies IFRS as one of its “Key Standards for Sound 
Financial Systems”; IFRS are featured in The Compendium of Standards which: “lists the 
various economic and financial standards - by both subject area and issuing body - that are 
internationally accepted as important for sound, stable and well-functioning financial 
systems.” (Financial Stability Board, 2015). It could be argued that the IASB as an 
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organisation, in “essence” (Suchman, 1995), has achieved a store of legitimacy, where it has 
become a taken-for-granted setter of international financial reporting standards.   
 
However, legitimacy of an organisation, once gained, must be maintained, and repaired if 
damaged.  For the IASB, legitimacy of its actions rests with the “acceptability and credibility 
[of] … those it seeks to govern” (Black, 2008, p144);  hence, in the context of a particular 
standard, such as IFRS8, the practices prescribed should embrace the ideological values and 
beliefs of the IASB’s audiences as to how reporting entities should identify, measure and 
communicate segmental information; this should be managed effectively through the IASB’s 
open, transparent and consultative due process over standard setting.  If  IFRS practice as 
encapsulated in one standard is accepted as legitimate, then such legitimation of the IASB’s 
operation should reinforce legitimation of the IASB itself as “…who and what is legitimised 
in the process” of accepting practice is pertinent (Georgiou & Jack, 2011, p313).  However, if 
a practice, such as that articulated in IFRS8, is contested, then the legitimacy of the IASB as a 
standard setter may be temporarily or permanently damaged.  
 
However, despite evident acceptance of the IASB as a legitimate standard setting 
organisation, operational actions of standard setting may be controversial and trigger episodic 
challenges to its legitimacy.  Arguably, such a challenge occurred in 2006 when the IASB 
announced that it was replacing International Accounting Standard (IAS)14R “Segmental 
Reporting” with IFRS8 “Operating Segments” for accounting periods starting on or after 1st 
January 2009 (IASB, 2006a, para IN2). This new standard mimicked the US’s SFAS 1314 
and attracted a lot of controversy during its adoption process (European Commission, 2007; 
Crawford, Helliar & Power, 2010; Crawford, Ferguson, Helliar & Power, 2014) with the 
Exposure Draft (ED) 8 ‘Operating Segments’ (IASB, 2006c)5 eliciting 182 comment letters 
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(IASB, 2006b). After analysing these comment letters, the IASB concluded that there was 
overall support for the approach which it proposed to mandate in IFRS8 (IASB, 2006d). 
 
At the same time, in 2007, the IASB amended its due process (IFRS Foundation, 2011) to 
include a post-implementation review (PIR) “of each new IFRS or major amendment” two 
years after the implementation of new IFRS requirements (IFRS Foundation, 2013a, p32). In 
2012, IFRS8 became the first standard to be subject to this PIR process. IFRS8 provided the 
platform through which the PIR process itself was developed (Crawford, Extance, Helliar & 
Power, 2012; Moldovan, 2014). For example, during the development of the PIR process, the 
European Financial Reporting Advisory Group’s (EFRAG) suggestions to include an open 
Request for Information (IFRS Foundation, 2013a, p30) was incorporated. This request now 
forms the first part of a two-stage PIR process which encompasses: (i) setting the scope of the 
PIR and deciding upon the questions to be asked in the ‘Request for Information’; and (ii) 
analysing information from this consultation (IFRS Foundation, 2013c, para 6.52-6.54). 
During this second stage, the process includes an option for the IASB to gather additional 
evidence from: reviewing the academic literature and other relevant research; conducting 
outreach events with “relevant parties”; and/or analysing financial statement disclosures 
(IFRS Foundation, 2013c, para 6.60). As such, the IASB’s first Request for Information was 
in regard to IFRS8’s implementation, and it undertook over 60 outreach events across the 
world as part of IFRS8’s PIR; more than half of these events were targeted at European 
audiences (IFRS Foundation, 2013a). Further outreach events were held solely with 17 
investors. In addition, the IASB specifically sourced non-US6 research to be considered 
during the post-implementation review in order to provide independent evidence of how 
IFRS8 was working in practice rather than relying on findings about the earlier 
implementation of SFAS 131 in the USA.   
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Studying the individual standard setting actions of the IASB in relation to the adoption of 
IFRS8 and separating this episode from the widespread acceptance of the IASB as a global 
standard setter, enables us to contribute to the literature by examining the temporal nature of 
legitimation and its impact on elements of pragmatic and moral legitimacy. In part, this 
analysis answers Deephouse and Suchman’s (2008) and Durocher and Fortin’s (2010) calls 
for more research on legitimation at multiple levels within different organisational fields, and 
extends the use of Suchman’s (1995) legitimation typology to critically examine the 
interactions between a supranational organisation, the IASB, and its diverse audiences.   
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss the 
temporal dynamic of legitimation and how this relates to Suchman’s typology of pragmatic 
and moral legitimacy. We then provide a brief history about the controversy surrounding 
IFRS8’s introduction and identify issues that caused concern amongst some audiences. The 
third section describes the research method employed which is followed by our discussion of 
findings.  Finally we present our conclusions. 
 
2. The temporal nature of legitimation 
This section focuses on the temporal nature of legitimacy. We first distinguish between 
pragmatic, moral and cognitive notions of legitimacy, before discerning which specific 
subtypes illuminate the temporal dynamic of legitimation relating to the IASB’s action of 
developing and reviewing IFRS8.7   
 
Understanding the reasons why audiences may grant legitimacy to the standard setting 
activity of the IASB is important, especially as various audiences may (or may not) perceive 
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accounting practice as legitimate for different reasons. For example, granting legitimacy may 
depend upon an audience’s view of the standard itself, in this case IFRS8, and their beliefs or 
expectations in relation to the prescribed accounting practice and/or the due process 
underpinning the standard’s adoption (i.e., the process leading to the IASB’s adoption and 
review of IFRS8). Legitimacy can be analysed in three broad types: pragmatic, moral and 
cognitive legitimacy (Suchman, 1995); such analysis has been used in the literature to 
interrogate international standard setting (Durocher, Fortin & Cote, 2007; Crawford, Helliar, 
Monk & Venezian, 2014) as well as to other spheres of regulatory activity (Black, 2008; 
Georgio & Jack, 2011; O’Dwyer, Owen & Unerman, 2011). 
 
Pragmatic legitimacy is based on audience evaluation of practice from a self-interested 
perspective and is easiest to obtain from those constituents most likely to support the practice 
(O’Dwyer, Owen & Unerman, 2011). Pragmatic legitimacy can be analysed further into 
exchange, influence and dispositional legitimacy. By way of illustration, if an audience 
perceives that: (i) it will benefit directly from IFRS8’s implementation; (ii) it can influence 
the development of IASB standards; and (iii) its interests are reflected in the goals and 
actions of the IASB, then that audience will confer exchange, influence and dispositional 
legitimacy respectively in respect of IFRS8. 
 
Moral legitimacy, of which there are four subtypes (consequential, procedural, personal and 
structural) is based on audience evaluation of whether a practice is “the right thing to do” 
(Suchman, 1995, p 579) from a public interest perspective (Georgiou & Jack, 2011, p313). 
Thus, an audience will confer consequential legitimacy if it deems that socially valued 
outcomes have or will emerge from the IASB’s actions. Such consequences may relate to the 
belief that IFRS8 disclosures will produce decision-useful information, in line the IASB’s 
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conceptual framework (IASB, 2010). Procedural legitimacy will be granted if audiences 
determine that the development and implementation of IFRS8 embraces socially accepted 
techniques and procedures, for example, the IASB’s due process. Finally, if audiences value 
organisational leaders as representing diverse audience interests, and perceive the IASB as an 
appropriate organisation to set international standards, then personal and structural legitimacy 
will be conferred, respectively. Finally, cognitive legitimacy does not involve audience 
evaluation; it reflects an institutionalised, enduring, “taken-for-granted acceptance” of an 
organisation and/or its practice (Georgio & Jack, 2011, p313). Cognitive legitimacy is not 
malleable as an organisational resource and lends itself to explaining legitimacy from an 
institutional perspective (Suchman, 1995). 
  
Our research is framed through the lens of strategic legitimacy and considers the temporal 
elements of pragmatic and moral legitimacy which involve audience evaluation of ‘what is’ 
and ‘what should be’, respectively (Crawford et al., 2014a). Legitimation has a “temporal 
texture” (Suchman, 1995, p583) and can operate at an episodic, transitory level or on a long-
lasting, continual basis.8 Thus, temporal legitimacy granted, or challenged, in respect of 
IFRS8, will represent an episode in time on a continuum in terms of legitimacy gained and 
maintained by the IASB for its existence and its actions. The subtypes of pragmatic and 
moral legitimacy can be distinguished according to this temporal dynamic as they relate to 
legitimation of actions [IFRS8] and the organisation [IASB]. In such a matrix, exchange and 
consequential legitimacy are aligned with audiences granting episodic legitimacy for the 
actions of an entity, whereas influence and procedural legitimacy relate to the granting of 
continual legitimacy for the actions of an entity.9 Table 1 elaborates on this matrix 
highlighting episodic and continual legitimacy for an organisation’s actions and its essence, 
in the context of IFRS8 and the IASB, respectively. Using this matrix to inform our research, 
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we interpret from our interviewee responses, whether there is evidence of temporal 
legitimacy granted or withheld in response to the controversy surrounding IFRS8.10  
 
 Insert Table 1 about here  
 
3. The IFRS8 controversy 
Disclosure of segmental data should not in itself be controversial11 as it involves information 
that should help users understand the performance of a business’s activities as well as the 
economic environments in which the reporting entity operates (IFRS8, para 1). Nevertheless, 
the underlying philosophy of IFRS8 was contested as it focussed on the ‘management 
approach’ to identifying segments which requires: 
“….identification of operating segments on the basis of internal reports that 
are regularly reviewed by the entity’s chief operating decision maker [CODM] 
in order to allocate resources to the segment and assess its performance”.  
(IFRS8 para IN11) 
 
In the case of IFRS8, the practice espoused was contested by key audiences with continued 
opposition to the standard throughout the adoption and implementation process (Crawford, 
Ferguson, Helliar & Power, 2014). Indeed, the European Parliament suggested that the 
segmental reporting practice mandated in IFRS8 would not produce “segmental information 
sufficient to allow users to assess the risks and drivers of the business in terms of geography”. 
For the first time in its history the European Parliament12- a powerful actor in the legitimation 
of  standards issued by the IASB - did not rely solely on the findings of the IASB’s due 
process; instead, as part of its own comitology procedure, the European Parliament asked the 
European Commission to carry out a ‘potential-impacts’ assessment and report back to 
Parliament before it would endorse IFRS8 for use within the European Union (EU) 
(European Commission, 2007; Crawford et al., 2014). When IFRS8 was eventually endorsed 
into European law, the European Parliament noted a number of concerns and requested that 
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the European Commission “…follow closely the application of IFRS8 and report back to the 
parliament no later than 2011…” and that “if the Commission discovers deficiencies in the 
application of IFRS8 it has a duty to rectify such deficiencies” (European Parliament, 
2007).13  
 
The adoption of IFRS8 caused concern (IASB, 2006a – IFRS8, Basis for Conclusions; IASB, 
2006b; European Commission, 2007) amongst diverse constituents about: (i) the management 
approach, including the impact of the chief operating decision maker (CODM) and non-IFRS 
measures on determining, aggregating and reporting segmental information; (ii) the lack of 
mandatory geographical segments; (iii) potential inconsistency with the IASB’s conceptual 
framework regarding consistency, comparability and decision-usefulness; and (iv) the 
prioritisation by the IASB on convergence with FASB standards over meeting the needs of 
other constituencies. 
 
Management approach, CODM, Non-IFRS measures and aggregations 
This CODM term is common in the US but, at the time of IFRS8’s adoption, the term was not 
commonly used elsewhere in the world, or employed by the IASB in any of its others 
standards. This concern resonated with notions of dispositional legitimacy, where the style 
and characteristics embodied in IFRS8 reflected US practice, potentially alienating non-US 
audiences from accepting the standard.  Indeed, a major constituent in the IASB’s standard 
setting process - the European Parliament - queried the meaning of the term “chief operating 
decision maker” (European Parliament, 2007). IFRS8’s guidance on determining the CODM, 
at the time, confused executive and operational functions, stating that the CODM could be 
“the chief executive officer or the chief operating officer, or … a group of executive 
directors … the board of directors” (IFRS8, para 7-8), or the “segment manager for some 
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operating segments” (para 9) or whoever or whatever allocates resources to, and assesses the 
performance of, the operating segments of the entity.   
 
Nevertheless, supporters of the standard argued that the management approach would allow a 
user to “see an enterprise ‘through the eyes of management’ [which] enhances a user’s ability 
to predict actions or reactions of management that can significantly affect the enterprise’s 
prospects for future cash flows” (IASB, 2006a - IFRS8, Appendix A, para 60). Proponents of 
this view may have given exchange and consequential legitimacy to the standard since it 
accorded with their values in terms of the supply of decision-useful information. Indeed, 
although Hermann and Thomas (2000) suggested that when the management approach of 
SFAS131 (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1997) was first used in the US it had been 
problematic, the consistency of segmental information provided was possibly enhanced: (i) as 
the same definitions of operating segments were used internally and externally; and (ii) the 
reporting entity had to explain the basis of its measurement for segment results and assets.  
 
It was argued that there was a lack of clear guidance in IFRS8 about identifying segments 
and, as materiality was not defined, the CODM could avoid disclosing useful disaggregated 
information about customers, products/services and geographical areas. IAS 14R had 
mandated how segments were to be identified, as well as the type and measurement of 
segmental revenues, expenses, results, assets and liabilities that were to be reported. By 
contrast, under IFRS8, management would have much more discretion over how operating 
segments were identified, with the possibility of a reduction in the number of segmental line 
item disclosures, especially those involving geographic information.  
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Legitimacy concerns were also raised by the financial press because, under IFRS8, 
information that was produced for internal management decisions would be supplied for 
external audiences, rather than being prepared specifically for this purpose; thus management 
would determine the level of aggregation employed by deciding upon the composition of a 
group’s segments, and the performance measures to be used for reporting on these segments’ 
activities (for example see: Neveling, 2007; Murphy, 2007 and Surkhaj, 2007a and 2007b). 
There was also concern over the level of aggregation among segments based on materiality 
grounds (Nichols & Street, 2007). 
 
Under the management approach, segmental information must be disclosed using non-IFRS 
measures if such information is supplied to the CODM. Any reconciling items between the 
financial statements and the IFRS8 disclosures only have to be based on “the total segment 
amounts to the amounts recognised in the entity’s financial statements” rather than on a line-
by-line basis (IASB, 2006a - IFRS8, para 28).  Indeed, there was concern that there could be 
sizeable reconciling items conflating unallocated items, such as overhead expenses with 
differences arising from non-IFRS measures thereby hindering the comparability and 
consistency of reported information over time and across companies (Crawford, Helliar & 
Power, 2010; Gordon & Gallery, 2012; Nobes, 2013). Commentators were also concerned 
that although IFRS8 would require material reconciling items to be disclosed separately, the 
standard did not define what was meant by the term ‘material’ (IFRS8, para 28). As a result 
some audiences complained bitterly during the standard setting process.  For example, 
Murphy (2007: 7) stated that: 
“The data doesn’t have to reconcile with the audited accounts, which is 
staggering.  And they don’t have to use the same process of accounting for 
segments as they do for the rest of the accounts.  Therefore the accounts are 
totally and utterly open to manipulation”. 
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Geographic disclosures 
The European Parliament expressed “reservation … that disclosure of geographical 
information would in practice … be reduced compared to IAS14[R]” (European Parliament, 
2007). Although entity-wide geographic disclosures are required under IFRS8, such 
disclosures are not mandatory if “the necessary information is not available and the cost to 
develop it would be excessive” (IFRS8, para 33). In addition, entity-wide disclosures are 
based on IFRS measures, which may be inconsistent with management approach measures 
prescribed in IFRS8 for segmental information, and the disclosures required are fewer than 
those previously mandated in IAS14(R)14. Indeed, Sukhraj (2007b) suggested that investors 
were “spitting mad … [and] perturbed by the removal of geographical segmentation which 
they deemed as important to them”15. Hence a lot of ‘noise’ in the financial press surrounded 
concerns about IFRS8 marginalising some constituent groups such as governments in 
developing countries (see for example, Murphy, 2007; Neveling, 2007 and Sukhraj, 2007a 
and b). Thus the legitimacy of IFRS8 may have been viewed differently depending upon the 
audience that was granting such legitimacy. 
 
Consistency with conceptual framework 
IFRS8 was also criticised because it contradicted the IASB’s own conceptual framework 
mirroring the US debate on the introduction of SFAS 131; critics pointed to a reduction in  
the comparability and consistency of segmental information relative to disaggregated data 
provided under IAS 14R. For example, under both SFAS 131 and IFRS8 management can 
vary what to disclose by changing internal reporting practices each year and management in 
different companies may choose to disclose similar information in different ways (Vernon, 
2007; IASB, 2006d)16. Arguably, consequential legitimacy may have been withheld for 
 15 
 
IFRS8 as some audiences may have questioned why the proposed standard did not align with 
the IASB’s conceptual framework in providing decision-useful information. 
 
Convergence and Post-implementation review 
Finally, another major concern was that convergence with the FASB was the sole motivation 
for adopting the management approach of IFRS8 (Vernon, 2007; European Parliament, 
2007). Indeed, the term CODM was taken directly from the US standard SFAS 131 and was 
criticised for being “vague and represent[ing] … US [requirements] over European 
accounting methods” (Neveling, 2007), and reflecting the convergence agenda of the IASB 
with the FASB. 
 
Concern relating to IFRS8’s due process and prioritising FASB convergence were evident. 
There was no discussion paper issued as part of IFRS8’s development; interested parties 
could only participate in the standard setting process during the IASB’s consultation over 
Exposure Draft (ED) 8 ‘Operating segments’ which closely mimicked the contents of 
SFAF131. The IASB received 182 comment letters in response to ED8, which exceeded the 
usual number of letters submitted by interested parties for other standards around that time. 
Only 6 comment letters were submitted from investors and analysts as ‘traditional’ users of 
financial statements17 In comparison, 47 comment letters were received from preparers. The 
IASB also reported that 80 comment letters received from members of the Publish What You 
Pay (PWYP) coalition18 (IASB, 2006d) were excluded from the IASB’s analysis that 
underpinned their Basis for Conclusions  “because [these PWYP] comments [were] not 
related to the management approach” (IASB, 2006d). The focus on FASB convergence and 
comment letter analysis dominated by preparer views could imply that the IASB was less 
concerned with attracting consequential and procedural legitimacy from diverse audiences 
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and were more interested in meeting the pragmatic legitimacy concerns of the FASB and 
preparers.  
 
4.  Research Method 
Two sets of interviews were carried out for this study. First, a series of 15 semi-structured 
interviews with key audiences was undertaken before IFRS8 became mandatory during 2009 
and the interviewer profile and stakeholder grouping of this cohort is shown in Panel A of 
Table 2. Second, 20 further interviews were undertaken, after the adoption of IFRS8 in 2011, 
as shown in Panel B of Table 2, all of whom were in the UK. Thus 35 interviews were 
undertaken in total with representatives of the key constituent groups which IFRS8 addresses. 
These interviewees were drawn from the authors’ contacts with key stakeholders at the time 
of the research. In the first set of interviews which took place before the standard was 
implemented, Legislators/ Regulators were approached whilst the topic was still current and 
visits were made to the European Commission (EC) in Brussels in order to understand the 
context surrounding the adoption of this accounting standard in Europe. All the other 
interviewees (Preparers, Auditors and Users (both institutional investor and non-institutional 
investor) were based in the UK. In the second set of interviews, the views of preparers, 
auditors and users were sought, reflecting the three audience groups discerned as the focus 
for the PIR consultation (IFRS Foundation, 2013). 19 20 
[Table 2 about here] 
Semi-structured questionnaires with several sections were developed and piloted on a number 
of academics and practitioners.21 22. Specifically, interviewees were asked questions relating 
to four controversial areas arising during IFRS8’s adoption which potentially challenged the 
legitimacy of the new standard (IASB, 2006 – IFRS8 Basis for Conclusions; European 
Commission, 2007): (i) the management approach; (ii) whether geographical disclosures 
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should be mandatory; (iii) whether the standard was principles-based or rules-based and 
whether it was compatible with the IASB’s own conceptual framework; and (iv) the extent to 
which IFRS8 had been influenced by a desire among regulators for international 
harmonisation.  
 
Each interview lasted about one hour and was attended by two members of the research team 
with a semi-structured questionnaire document being used by the team to ensure that a 
consistent set of questions was asked. All interviews were digitally recorded and these 
recordings were supplemented with notes made during the interviews. All recordings were 
fully transcribed and then analysed by the research team in conjunction with the notes that 
had been taken. A table was constructed to summarise the responses of the interviewees to 
the questions asked and this table was used when writing up the findings.  
 
5. Discussion of findings 
 
The interviews were analysed across the four controversial areas that were discussed in 
Section 3, and responses are interpreted in this part of the paper using the framework 
presented in Table 1. 
 
Management Approach 
IFRS8 adopts a new way of reporting segmental information – that of the management 
approach. Thus the interviewees were asked about their thoughts on this approach.  
Interviewee A2 argued that from an auditors’ point of view, this management approach was 
unhelpful: 
 “This idea of effectively allowing the users to see segmental information 
as if it was the management accounts, which is what the objective is, it’s 
just not realistic.  It’s not a realistic goal in my view.  And I don’t think 
it’s realistically achievable.” 
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He continued by noting that: 
 “Sometimes there’s anecdotal evidence of companies actually changing 
their internal reporting prior to implementing the standard … I haven’t 
seen it, but I’ve got anecdotal evidence of companies doing it.  I haven’t 
seen it, but I’ve had other people tell me that they’ve seen it.” 
Investors were also less than enthusiastic about the management approach and claimed that it 
would allow companies to hide unfavourable news from users of financial statements.  For 
example, user U2A suggested that the basis of identifying segments in IFRS8 was 
“fundamentally flawed” and ignored the possible self-interested behaviour of boards.  U6 was 
also sceptical and noted that: 
 “I can’t live with [the management approach] personally because I don’t 
feel that I can rely on [the resulting segmental information] as an 
investor... Because as a knowledgeable investor perhaps I know what 
goes into some of these things and I think it’s open for manipulation and 
it’s open for companies disguising poor performance... - to my mind 
you’re mixing apples and oranges. The annual report is not management 
information per se, it’s financial accounting data and it should remain 
that. There is scope in there for manipulation, [if] you take [revenues or 
expenses] out of one division [and] put it in another division.” 
User U1 agreed with this view.  Specifically, he stated that: 
 “..  the reason they created [the current set of operating segments], was so 
they couldn’t tell us what was in them.  Let’s say one of the motivating 
factors behind creating them was to hide stuff from us...It’s useful if 
management can be trusted but some management teams can be trusted 
and some can’t...If they are presenting information in such a way that we 
are able to forecast operating margins, all well and good; if they are 
playing games and saying “let’s take the fastest growing division and lets 
sort of put all the good stuff into that one to sort of extrapolate from it and 
come out with a higher total figure” [its unhelpful for investors].  So in a 
sense it depends again on what's in the hearts of people presenting the 
information to us...so I think it’s quite difficult to see through because 
there are choices as to how you create segments.” 
 
Legislators and regulators were also concerned about the management focus of IFRS8. For 
example L2A was worried that the management approach was “a bit … too business 
convenient”. L1A agreed with this concern when he suggested that IFRS8 might allow 
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management to “manipulate” information in order “to present [the firm] in a favourable light 
or conceal [adverse aspects of performance]”. 
 
With regard to the term CODM and the decision as to who this person or group might be, 
some of the interviewees suggested that it would be a CEO (possibly in conjunction with the 
FD), others indicated that it would be the Board of Directors and some claimed that they just 
did not know. Even one of the preparers highlighted that, if the CODM was the Board there 
could be problems; the CEO and FD “see a whole lot of things that never [get] to the Board’ 
and these would not have to be disclosed under IFRS8; they act as gatekeepers”. He thus 
implied that it would be easy for management to hide information simply by providing details 
to the FD and CEO and withholding it from the board. Further U4 noted that: 
 “In company law there is only one group who are responsible and that is 
the board, it can’t be anyone else; if it is, you are … building in an … 
American concept into European thinking without any change in company 
law.  Therefore you would have a direct conflict between the board being 
responsible for a set of accounts and having a chief operating decision 
maker who may actually be management, quite distinct from the board 
[deciding on what segmental information is included in these financial 
statements].” 
 
Investor I2A was not atypical when he noted that this issue was problematic: 
“I am not sure exactly how you would define it and how you get to what 
that particular role [is all about] because it … probably differs between 
different organisations and perhaps different segments of the business as 
well. So I am a bit sceptical as to how, ultimately, it works”. 
 
User U2 was more forthright about the identity of the CODM when he noted that it was an 
“alien concept to Anglo-Saxon thinking”. 
 
Overall, our interview evidence suggests that the users did not grant exchange legitimacy, 
expressing concern that the management approach would create segmental information that 
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was unreliable and not helpful to them.  Consequential legitimacy was seemingly withheld by 
all interview groups in relation to the management approach and the lack of guidance over 
the CODM meaning that reporting entities might be able to manipulate segmental 
information in their own favour. Finally, dispositional legitimacy was threatened in relation 
to the use of American terminology (CODM), which did not resonate with the interests of the 
interviewee groups in this current paper.  Indeed, users were less favourably disposed to 
IFRS8 than any of the other constituent groups. In part, this result accords with the findings 
of Kwok and Sharp (2005) who noted that preparers preferred the management approach to 
the risk and reward approach of IAS 14, and that the non-preparer groups preferred 
standardised segmental results.  
 
However, preparers also expressed concern that compliance with IFRS8 would result in 
disclosure of commercially sensitive23 information, suggesting that, in this regard, exchange 
and dispositional legitimacy have been withheld by preparers from IFRS8 and the IASB, 
respectively. For example, Auditor A4 was especially worried about the issue of commercial 
sensitivity for smaller companies: 
 
 “One sometimes hears the point made in smaller companies that segmental 
disclosure can bear unfairly down on them in the sense that because they 
wouldn’t have as many segments … it is obvious who they were dealing with in 
a key area.” 
 
Indeed, a preparer (P1) in a small company agreed that the publication of some segmental 
information could put his firm at a competitive disadvantage.  He stated that: “There’s always 
an element of commercial sensitivity [in disaggregated data], provided by small firms.”  He 
continued in the same vein that: “the segmentation and legal entity don’t match up exactly … 
the way we segment the business is different” and to get over commercial sensitivity he 
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owned up to “the fact that [his firm] are taking advantage effectively of the fact that one 
segment is over 75%.” 
 
However, Auditor A2 noted that preparers could still avoid disclosing sensitive information; 
and suggested that “anecdotally they probably deal with that through the CODM definition”.  
Auditor A3 thought it was an interesting issue – especially when related to the use of transfer 
pricing: 
“The transfer pricing one then gets interesting  because again the standard is 
quite clear in terms of what you’re supposed to put in your segmental 
disclosure; it is supposed to use the same basis of transfer pricing as you use 
for management reporting and you’re supposed to disclosure to what extent 
that’s on an arm’s length basis or an agreed transfer prices basis,  That's really 
the hyper sensitive stuff, on the basis that you’re supposed to put your 
management reporting in you can’t play around with it that much.  There is no 
point in having management reporting where you go and change your transfer 
pricing just because you don’t want to put that information in your segmental 
reporting, because you lose sight of actually how you’re managing your 
business.” 
 
It would appear therefore, that although preparers may not have supported the standard as it 
threatened disclosure of commercially sensitive information, there was a view amongst 
interviewees that the management approach and the CODM offered enough flexibility and 
choice to preparers to attenuate this concern.  
 
The management approach of IFRS8 requires the use of non-IFRS measures if these are used 
internally to report segmental information to the CODM.   P3 was critical of the use of non-
IFRS measures in general, noting that: 
 
“I would say that non-GAAP [non-IFRS] measures have the greatest 
prominence, when people want to give you the earnings before bad news 
basically.” 
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U3 was confused about non-IFRS numbers and questioned how they linked with the rest of 
the annual report: 
 
 “Oh look they have a figure here which says one thing but in this note it says 
something totally different. There is normally a very rational explanation for 
why a number that appears to represent an entity in one place is different in 
another, and it might just be that you, the reader, misunderstood what they are 
actually talking about.” 
 
On the issue of reconciling items I1A pointed that that ‘non-GAAP [non-IFRS] measures 
may result in a ‘lump’ of corporate costs as the reconciling item which is not very useful”.  
Analyst I2A was even more emphatic about this point: 
 
“Lack of reconciliation is wrong; [segmental data] should reconcile back 
[to the main financial statements] and [the fact that it doesn’t] will reduce 
the usefulness of the information [non-IFRS]. The size of the 
reconciliation amount between any non- GAAP segmental information and 
the numbers in the financial statements [will be important]”. 
 
Both of these analysts (I1A and I2A) suggested that this issue would not be an 
insurmountable hurdle for “sophisticated analyst users” who may be able to get information 
about any reconciliation amount “through meetings with the company”. For ordinary 
investors, however, they thought that this aspect of IFRS8 was problematic.  Indeed U6 
commented that: 
“You have to give me the ability to understand in great detail what it is I’m 
looking at, and just putting in management information with lump sum 
reconciling items is just not good enough.” 
 
Thus, the use of non-IFRS measures did not receive exchange nor consequential legitimacy 
from users, perceiving that they would not be able to understand the information disclosed, 
rendering it not useful.  
 
 
Non-mandatory geographical information 
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Adding to the controversy over IFRS8 was the fact that IFRS8 no longer mandated the 
disclosure of geographical information. This was a particular concern publicised by the 
PWYP coalition of international not-for-profit organisations (PWYP, 2005 & 2006), raising 
moral legitimacy concerns relating to lack of transparency in segmental reporting. Our 
interviewees were of the view that disclosures by geographic area were useful to investors.  
Indeed, investor I2A benefited from segmental information which he used “to build models” 
of a company’s performance in different regions; I2A admitted that without such geographic 
data exchanges his approach to security valuation would be “up the Swanee”.  In addition, 
I2A also expressed consequential legitimacy concerns that “NGOs should be interested in 
where a company is operating, what assets it’s got [in different locations], and [if there were] 
environmental or [human] rights issues [affecting] the firm”.  User U6 expressed a similar 
view regarding the usefulness of geographic information: 
 
 “My general impression is [that this geographical disclosure is] really helpful 
information to me as an investor and as a reader of the accounts.  [I tend to ask 
whether] I understand what it’s actually telling me and it is consistent with the 
rest of the annual report or is it trying to mix apples and oranges. … I am really 
going to rely on that to make [many] decisions.  So it’s just a question of what is 
it I’m seeing [and] what is the story I’m being told.” 
 
However, one auditor (A1) believed that geographical disclosure “was still required” based 
upon her reading of paragraph 33 of IFRS8 and “was not convinced” that for many 
companies IFRS8 geographic disclosures would be different from information supplied under 
IAS 14R.  However, auditor (A2) was more pessimistic about the consequences of IFRS8, 
stating it: 
“… probably doesn’t [require mandatory disclosure of geographical 
operating segments] if you don’t operate across lots of geographical 
segments.  If you operate in more than one country, then yes it does.  … 
To a certain extent some of the information which you used to get under 
IAS 14 has been lost in terms of geographic [disclosures].” 
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This pessimistic view was held by U2 who commented: 
 “Yeah.  So why put together Malaysian and Indonesian business as opposed to 
[divisions from other countries] … they’re different economies, different 
underlying exchange rates, so actually split it out and let us see what’s going on 
in both.” 
 
Hence, again there is evidence that users did not see the ‘exchange’ benefit of IFRS8, 
indicating a concern that the IASB did not share their dispositional interest in what 
constituted useful information for them. Auditors to a lesser extent were concerned about the 
consequential legitimacy of the standard, musing that IFRS8 would not precipitate significant 
segmental reporting changes compared to its predecessor IAS14(R).  
The aggregation issue and materiality question were pertinent for preparers as larger 
companies might have a sizeable number of segments; a number of interviewees worried 
about what level of detail was needed and what amount of aggregation was permissible.  For 
example, P3 pointed out that: 
 
“[There] are five [segments] in our annual report.  However you then have distinct 
units within these segments which are defined [within the company] but which we 
don’t talk about in this annual report document, and then some of those units have 
further units... the justification might be that business activities are not dissimilar. So 
we’ve already got five [operating segments in the financial statements bit], if you go 
the next level, you know, you’re going to go on to ten or twelve, which is beginning 
to get a bit unreal...What is actually monitored by a group executive committee is 55 
business units.” 
 
Overall, the interviewees did not grant consequential legitimacy to IFRS8 as they had 
concerns about the lack of guidance over the aggregation of units into operating segments and 
were worried about the absence of a definition about materiality. Preparers were most 
concerned about commercial sensitivity and hence, exchange legitimacy was more apparent 
with preparers. 
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Conceptual framework 
Regarding the conceptual framework, there was a general agreement among the interviewees 
that IFRS8 was not consistent with the principle that financial information had to be decision 
useful.  In particular, there were consequential legitimacy concerns that the information 
supplied under IFRS8 would not satisfy the criteria for usefulness as outlined in the 
conceptual framework,, as user U4 stated: 
 
Although IAS 14 was certainly more prescriptive, it was easier to understand … 
at least there was consistency in it, … We are definitely losing comparability 
because the choice of segment and the choice of emphasis within segmental 
reporting has been broadened and therefore what we are seeing is an inevitable 
loss of comparability. …  We are losing one of the key qualities of accounting 
information as a result and if we are losing that key quality then you are 
undermining the value of the reports that are being produced.  As a result, if you 
are trying to encourage the effective allocation of resources, which is what they 
say they're doing, they're reducing the quality of the information which is 
available to ensure that resources are being allocated effectively.  So by their 
own yard stick of what is the purpose of accounting, I believe that IFRS8 is a 
failure, they don’t agree I'm sure, but I'm not sure that the IASB is committed to 
what it says it is anyway.” 
 
 
This user also continued to raise concerns suggesting that, in particular the European 
constituents, were unsure of awarding personal and structural legitimacy of the IASB as a 
legitimate international standard setting organisation: 
 
“I have no problem, if [IFRS8 disclosures are] considered to be useful by an 
investor, but I don’t think it supplants the obligation to supply consistent 
ongoing information which is of use to the long term investor, who actually is 
looking at a stewardship function, and to those beyond, because I think there are 
other users of financial information. I think that IASB, if it is really going to 
produce a single set of accounting standards, has to consider the needs of 
multiple users. Its attempt to reduce it to one group of users is where it’s going 
wrong.  That's clearly, political.  Let’s be honest, Europe gave it its power and 
they are mighty fed up, you know.  I think that there is a real risk that [the IASB] 
are going to alienate what was the source of their power and they just treat them 
with contempt; you can’t take us to court, you can’t involve politics in what 
we’re doing, they say. But all accounting is political.” 
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Convergence agenda and the post-implementation review process 
Regulators and legislator interviewees pointed out that the US origin of IFRS8’s content 
could be problematic; a number questioned the IASB’s disposition, which, in their minds, 
prioritised convergence with FASB, over meeting the interests of other audiences. For 
instance, R4A said that “I think we often have some problems with things going the 
American way”.  R2A further elaborated reflected on the procedural legitimacy leading to 
IFRS8 adoption, stating that 
 “I thought it was extremely bad to copy an American standard on principle 
because of the way they are worded and developed to deal with specific 
American problems and American law. In particular with IFRS8 I thought it was 
very bad to not have consistent accounting for segments, consistent with GAAP 
… I just didn’t like this copying of what FASB did because the wording and the 
way their statements are framed always annoy me.  You know, I just felt we 
should at least write it in our language but this was part of the US convergence 
and if you read the IASB’s reasons for doing it it’s substantially to converge 
with the US and I don’t like the idea.” 
 
Interviewees were asked if they thought the post-implementation review of IFRS8 would 
mitigate against concerns raised about IFRS8’s development and its potential impact on 
segmental reporting.  Preparers in general indicated that IFRS8 had met their pragmatic needs 
and did envisage they would contribute to a PIR. Specifically, P3 said: [IFRS8]’s not a 
standard you necessarily think or would be demanding, or shouting for a review”, and P2 
echoed this, saying the standard was not “disagreeable”.  P6 explained that compliance with 
IFRS8 had “been fairly smooth”; however, they indicated that consequential legitimacy needs 
had to be met for users, saying that:  
 “analysts to take part in a review of how good [IFRS8] has been in terms of 
providing them with information than it would be for someone like me who 
prepares the accounts to take part in a review … we've kind of ticked that box as 
a preparer but it might be useful to go back and review it from who it was meant 
to benefit in the first place and has it met that requirement? 
 
Auditors interviewed did not express a great deal of enthusiasm about engaging in a PIR of 
IFRS8, as arguing that “things have moved on … I’m not too sure that it would serve a huge 
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amount of purpose” (A2). One Big4 partner (A3) also suggested “it’s perhaps [too] early to 
be doing post implementation reviews”, while another (A7) stated that: 
 
I think if they are going to spend the money they would be better of spending 
their time doing something else, which would be looking at the overall 
usefulness of the accounts not focusing in on is IFRS8 been a good thing or not. 
 
As with the preparers interviewed, A2 also suggested that the PIR would only be of interest 
to users/investors if they felt “ they weren’t getting as good information as they were getting 
previously”.I2A, expressed support for the PIR, and implied that users might be able to 
influence potential amendment of IFRS8 by engaging in the process and raising their 
concerns about the quality of IFRS8 prescribed segmental information: 
“… some form of follow up is required, because there's that much divergence in 
interpretations that [IFRS8] maybe have actually impinged on the information 
that companies are giving.  So I suppose it goes back to how people have 
interpreted it and how it's been actually implemented.  And if you've got two 
companies in the same industry that are materially disclosing something that's 
dissimilar, I think that just raises a big question as to how it's been implemented 
and what information the companies have had internally and what information 
the auditors have had.  In terms of why are they having to sign off on it this way 
or that way.   
 
From our interviewee responses, it would appear that the focus of the IASB on converging 
with the US FASB led regulators and legislators to question the dispositional legitimacy of 
the IASB and also its procedural legitimacy relating to ‘copying’ a US standard. In 
considering whether the PIR would mitigate against process and outcome concerns relating to 
IFRS8, it would appear that auditors and preparers have accepted IFRS8 as legitimate for 
their own purposes (exchange legitimacy), but are aware that the consequences of IFRS8 for 
users of segmental reporting remain problematic.  
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we present evidence of the temporal dynamic of legitimation by examining 
audience perceptions of the adoption and post-implementation review of IFRS8. Through 
interpretation of 35 semi-structured interviews, undertaken in 2009 and 2011, we conclude 
that the predominant subtypes of legitimation threatened during the adoption of IFRS8 relate 
to episodic legitimacy. Specifically, pragmatic/exchange and moral/consequential legitimacy 
of the IASBs actions and pragmatic/dispositional legitimacy of the IASB in itself were 
arguably threatened during the IFRS8 episode.   
 
Examples of areas where the granting of legitimacy for the adoption and potential impact of 
IFRS8 by certain audiences has been threatened are presented in Table 3- illuminated through 
the dynamics of episodic and continual legitimacy. It would appear from our analysis that the 
events surrounding the development and potential reporting outcomes of IFRS8 did not 
expressly raise continual legitimacy concern from audiences about the IASB’s actions, with 
the exception of a regulator’s worry about the “bad practice” associated with copying a US 
standard. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Specifically, we evidence from our interviews that exchange legitimacy was not granted by 
users in a number of areas relating to: the management approach, the concept of the CODM 
and the use of non-IFRS measures; the lack of cohesion with the conceptual framework; and 
the decision not to mandate the disclosure of geographical segmental information. The users 
were particularly worried that preparers could conceal information and render segmental 
reporting under IFRS8 less useful than that previously disclosed under IAS14(R). Arguably, 
auditors and regulators were not affected by the standard at a pragmatic exchange legitimacy 
level but preparers in general granted exchange legitimacy as their views were generally 
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supportive of the standard, apart from concerns about commercial sensitivity (see also Kwok 
& Sharp, 2005). 
 
The standard also appeared to raise consequential legitimacy concerns from all interviewee 
groups as the quality of segmental information disclosed under IFRS8 could potentially 
conflict with the objective and characteristics of the IASB’s conceptual framework. 
Additionally, the IASB’s disposition of pursuing convergence with US practice at the 
expense of reflecting other audience interests was, for regulators, a concern, as was the 
procedure of ‘copying’ the US standard. In contrast to Durocher and Fortin (2010) who 
examine practice from the standard setters’ perspective, this paper reviews the case of a 
particular standard from the perspective of constituents other than the standard setter. 
Durocher and Fortin (2010) find that standard setters devote more energy to maintaining 
moral legitimacy over pragmatic legitimacy. Our research implies that the IASB can perhaps 
rely on its reputation and the general acceptance of its role as an international standard setter 
to counter temporary challenges from a number of audiences to the episodic legitimacy of 
individual standards.    
 
Regardless of this reliance on previously gained legitimacy, the IASB amended its standard 
setting due process in 2007 to include a PIR process (IFRS Foundation, 2011). The PIR 
afforded audiences with an opportunity to confer elements of continual legitimacy on the 
IASB in relation to IFRS8; audiences could potentially influence (see Table 1) any 
amendment of IFRS8 to reflect their own pragmatic needs, and moral concerns, through 
participating in the PIR consultations and outreach events. However, our interview findings 
suggest that a willingness to contribute to the PIR was not evident amongst the auditors and 
preparers, though they recognised the potential influence legitimacy that users might confer if 
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they participated in the PIR process. However, the IASB published the outcome of its first, 
newly constituted, PIR of IFRS8 in 2013 and concluded that there was no need to amend 
IFRS8. Somewhat surprisingly, despite concerns raised: (i) at the time of IFRS8’s adoption 
(European Commission, 2007; European Parliament; 2007; Crawford et al., 2010); (ii) during 
the standard’s implementation (ESMA, 2011; FRRP, 2010; Crawford et al., 2012), and (iii) in 
submissions to the PIR (IFRS Foundation, 2012a, 2012b and 2013b staff papers), the IASB 
decided that “the standard achieved its objectives and improved financial reporting” (IFRS 
Foundation, 2013a).  
 
The IASB’s response to its own PIR consultation and outreach events suggests that the IASB 
is not inclined to act on the concerns raised by certain audiences in relation to a particular 
standard such as IFRS8. Engaging with key audiences during the PIR of IFRS8 might have 
been viewed as an opportunity for the IASB to repair evident fluctuations in episodic 
legitimacy, arguably lost during the adoption of IFRS8. This suggests that repairing 
fluctuations in episodic legitimacy is not a priority for the IASB. Perhaps the IASB believes 
that its “stock” of legitimacy for its “essence”, as an international accounting standard setter 
has not been sufficiently threatened over the controversial IFRS8 episode. However, at some 
point, such incremental, episodic legitimation damage could precipitate a crisis of 
legitimation for the IASB, which will necessitate the IASB to devote resources to repairing 
legitimacy if it wants to retain its position as an accepted standard setter for international 
financial reporting.  
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1 In 2002, the IASB and the FASB entered into a formal international alliance, signing the Norwalk Agreement 
where both committed to work towards the convergence of financial reporting in pursuit of stabilising global 
financial markets. As part of this agreement, the two standard setters instigated a short-term convergence 
project, identifying a number of standards that could be converged without major re-writes; this included 
converging IAS14 (Revised), which was published in 1997 by the IASC (IASC, 1997) to regulate the disclosure 
of disaggregated information, with SFAS131 (Norwalk Agreement, 2002). 
2The IMF and WB recognise international standards in 12 policy areas related to their work; IASB 
pronouncements, together with standards issued by the International Audit and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB), ostensibly contribute towards rigorous and credible capital market infrastructure (IMF, 2011). 
3 At the time or writing, 116 countries require IFRS “for all or most domestic publicly accountable entities 
(listed companies and financial institutions)” (IFRS Foundation, 2015). 
4 Except for: (i) minor differences, as noted in the Basis for Conclusions and (ii) terminology changes that were 
necessary to comply with other IFRSs (IASB, 2006a, para Basis for Conclusions 60). 
5 Before issuing ED 8, the IASB considered the findings from academic research about the introduction 
SFAS131 (which had been adopted in the US in 1997) and undertook “several meetings with users of financial 
statements” (IASB, 2006a, para Basis for Conclusions 7). 
6 This is important because at the time of IFRS8’s development and adoption, the IASB was pursuing 
convergence with the US FASB and focused on gathering evidence from US academic research relating to 
SFAS131 (IASB, 2006). 
7 Pragmatic and moral legitimacy have been the subject of previous studies but these examine the legitimacy of 
standard setters internally from the standard setters view point, rather than from the perspective of external 
audiences. Some of these internal examinations concentrate on the due process associated with the adoption of 
new standards, reflecting procedural legitimacy (Durocher & Fortin, 2010; Jeppesen, 2010; Danjou & Walton, 
2012). Others focus on the engagement of certain constituents with the standard setting process via the strategic 
appointment of certain audiences to non-decision making roles to gain influential legitimacy on various sub 
committees or working parties (Durocher & Fortin, 2010)  aligning them with the standard setting process. A 
third group of studies have examined personal legitimacy through the roles of specific individuals that have 
been involved in the standard setting process. Such studies have covered formal standard setting structures at the 
international (Durocher & Fortin, 2010; Jeppesen, 2010; Power, 2010) and professional levels (Deephouse & 
Suchman, 2008).  
8 Legitimacy for standard setters such as the IASB may be granted over time, in a dynamic process, through the 
repetition of practices (Suchman, 1995; Georgiou & Jack, 2011), such as those associated with the routine 
implementation of due process and adoption of new accounting standards. Hence each new standard introduced 
by the IASB represents an episode in its own legitimation that may enhance or damage continual legitimacy for 
accounting practice.  
9 The temporal dynamic as it relates to the IASB in essence frames dispositional (interest) and personal 
legitimacy as elements of episodic legitimacy, and dispositional (character) and structural as elements of 
continual legitimacy.  The legitimacy of the IASB’s essence is out with the focus of the current research.  
10 The dynamics of legitimation are presented here as distinct reasons as to why external audiences might give 
support to a practice (IFRS8). In actuality, each type of legitimation is not separable; they often interact with 
one another (O’Dwyer, Owen & Unerman, 2011) and may “sometimes work against each other but more often 
[than not] reinforce one another” (Georgiou & Jack, 2011, p313) 
11 Although it should be noted that there is a long history of segmental reporting being problematic for standard 
setters (Rennie & Emmanuel, 1992; Emmanuel, Garrod, McCallum & Rennie, 1999; Edwards & Smith, 1996) 
and adopting IFRS8 was no exception. 
12 A crave out had been granted to IAS 39, but this had not involved the European Parliament’s comitology 
process. 
13 Indeed, after IFRS8 had been introduced, the UK’s Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) expressed 
“concern about how companies [were] reporting the performance of key parts of their business in the light of the 
introduction of IFRS8”. In addition, the European Securities and Markets Authority reported back to the 
European Parliament that, although original concerns about a possible reduction in geographical disclosures 
appear to have been allayed, issues remained about: the identity of the CODM; the use of non-IFRS measures; 
and the criteria for aggregating operating segments (European Securities and Markets Authority, 2011b). Similar 
issues have also been documented in a UK context (Crawford, Extance, Helliar % Power 2012). 
14 Geographic entity-wide disclosures only covered: (i) reporting revenues from external customers; 
(ii) reporting non-current assets; and (iii) distinguishing between the entity’s country of domicile and foreign 
countries in total. Further, entity-wide disclosures Revenues and profits by geographic area were no longer 
mandated in the new standard, unless an individual foreign country was material. 
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15 Hooks & Staden (2011) note that there are different approaches to analysing the content of documents, in their 
content analysis of environmental disclosures demonstrate that the results from different forms of content 
analysis are highly correlated with each other. 
16 Indeed, the European Parliament expressed concern in its endorsement instrument that segmental disclosures 
“must” be comparable (European Parliament, 2007), and that endorsement of IFRS had to have regard to the 
decision-useful criteria of European Commission Regulation (European Parliament, 2002). 
17 This reflects user ‘lack of’ participation in the standard setting process (Sutton, 1984; Loft, Humphrey & 
Turley, 2006; Young, 2006; EC, 2007; Chiapello & Medjad 2009; Durocher & Fortin, 2011; Richardson & 
Eberlein, 2011; Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Jorissen, Lybaert, Orens & Van der Tas, 2012). 
18 The PWYP coalition is a group of non-governmental organisations and charities that campaign for greater 
transparency of payments paid by companies operating in the extractive industries to governments of developing 
countries. 
19 The interviewees do not represent a random sample, and any generalisations from their viewpoints might be 
problematic. However, care was taken to get a spread of views from across the different groups. 
20 Interviewees’ views may have changed over time but we were capturing their opinions on four particular 
issues and not the standard as a whole. 
21 This was part of a larger study; in the full study, questions were also asked to explore stakeholders’ 
perceptions of the EU endorsement process (Crawford et al., 2010). Responses to this issue are not reported in 
the current paper. 
22 We asked the interviewees if they had submitted a comment letter to the exposure draft associated with 
IFRS8. Some had responded on behalf of their regulatory bodies or sent in a comment as a representative of 
their audit firm.  Thus, the views expressed in these comment letters were not necessarily the interviewees’ own 
opinions. A number of these noted that their responses were supportive while others were critical. However, in 
general the four areas examined in this paper did not correspond exactly to the comment letter questions, apart 
from a question on the management approach. Hence, we have not attempted to cross check our analysis in this 
paper with any comment letter responses. 
23IFRS8 no longer allowed companies to opt out of segmental disclosures on the grounds of commercial 
sensitivity. 
